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ARGUMENT 
The Maqistrate Erred By Dismissing The License Suspension Proceedings 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate dismissed license suspension proceedings for refusal to 
take a requested BAC test. (R., p. 33.) The grounds the magistrate provided for 
his actions were that the officer's sworn statement of refusal had been filed in the 
court more than seven days after the refusal and that the rights advisory (see R., 
p. 9) was vague as related to seizing out-of-state drivers' licenses such as 
Kling's. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-1 1; p. 13, L. 19 - p. 14, L. 10.) The district court 
affirmed. (R., pp. 126-37.) The magistrate erred in dismissing (and the district 
court in not reversing on appeal) because there is no seven-day filing 
requirement for the officer's sworn statement and because there is no vagueness 
in the advisory. (Appellant's brief.) 
In response, Kling argues that the magistrate properly dismissed for lack 
of a filing within seven days by the officer because (1) the magistrate had 
authority from some unnamed and unstated legal source to effectuate the 
effective administration of the court's business; (2) that because she had to file a 
request for a hearing within seven days under the statute the officer should be 
forced to file a sworn statement in the same time-frame (even though the statute 
has no filing deadline for the officer's sworn statement); and (3) because a 
different and inapplicable statute requires a filing by the officer before the Idaho 
Transportation Department within five days, the in pari materia reading of the 
applicable statue (which does not mention any time requirements for filing) 
requires the filing in court of a sworn statement in seven days. (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 15-20.) Kling also argues that the advisory did not strictly follow the 
statute and was therefore inadequate and contends that the advisory could be 
misconstrued and is therefore vague. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-1 5.) None of 
these arguments has merit. 
B. There Is No Seven-Day Filing Period And The Court Lacked Authority To 
Arbitrarily Establish One 
Neither the courts below nor Kling on appeal can point to any statute or 
rule of procedure requiring an officer to file a sworn statement of refusal within 
seven days. Nor can they point to any statute or rule granting magistrates the 
authority to fix a seven day filing period and treat it as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. In the absence of any such authority Kling argues that the seven- 
day filing limitation arises out of some undefined need to impose an arbitrary 
deadline to effectuate the effective administration of the court's business. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 18-1 9.) This argument is without legal or logical merit. 
Although Kling cites none (see generally Respondent's brief), there is legal 
authority addressing a court's inherent powers to manage its cases. A court has 
"inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently manage the cases before 
it." Department of Labor and Indus. Serv. V. East ldaho Mills, Inc., 11 1 ldaho 
137, 138-39, 721 P.2d 736, 737-38 (Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added, internal 
citations omitted). This inherent power must be weighed against the court's duty 
to "do substantial justice." Id. Thus, the power to impose deadlines applies only 
to active cases, and must not be arbitrary. 
The seven-day jurisdictional deadline for filing imposed by the lower courts 
is invalid because it does not govern active cases. This case was commenced 
upon Kling's filing of a request for a hearing under 1.C. § 18-8002(4)(b). (R., pp. 
3-4.) Once   ling requested a hearing and assumed the burden of proving a 
justified refusal to submit to a requested BAC test, a sworn statement by the 
officer was not even required. In re Hanson, 121 ldaho 507, 511-12, 826 P.2d 
468, 472-73 (1992) ("Nothing in 1.C. § 18-8002(4)(b) requires an affidavit where 
there has been a request by the driver for a hearing on his license suspension. If 
such a hearing is requested, then the court's decision will be based upon the 
evidence and testimony admitted at the hearing, not on any affidavit.") Because 
the sworn statement was irrelevant to whether Kling could prove one of the 
grounds justifying refusal, the magistrate was not exercising any inherent power 
to manage the case before him. 
Likewise, the deadline is arbitrary and does not balance the effective 
administration of the court with "substantial justice" for two reasons. First, the 
affidavit is entirely superfluous to the case before the magistrate. In re Hanson, 
121 ldaho at 51 1-12, 826 P.2d at 472-73. Because no such affidavit was 
required in this case the seven-day filing requirement was no benefit to case 
management whatsoever, much less one that overcomes the obligation to do 
substantial justice. Second, even if the seven-day deadline conferred some 
benefit to management of the case the dismissal in this case was not based on 
any prejudice by the petitioner and the deadline was arbitrary. The court 
performed no balancing required for the imposition of sanctions, but instead 
treated the seven-day filing as a jurisdictional prerequisite rather than a 
scheduling order. The court lacked authority to so limit its jurisdiction and acted 
arbitrarily rather than balancing the need to manage its calendar against the 
requirement to do substantial justice. 
The seven-day deadline imposed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal 
was beyond the scope of the district court's authority. The argument that the 
court was merely efficiently managing this case does not withstand analysis. 
C. The Advisow Was Not Defective Or Vague Under The Applicable Statutes 
The notice in this case was adequate, and the lower courts therefore 
erred, because that notice accurately informed Kling that if she refused the 
requested BAC test her driving privileges in ldaho would be suspended; that she 
would retain temporary driving privileges in ldaho for 30 days; and that she had 
the right to challenge the suspension by filing a request for hearing within seven 
days. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.) Kling does not dispute that the advisory 
accurately notified her of what actually happened upon her refusal. Kling instead 
argues that the suspension advisory was defective because it did not state that 
her out-of-state license would be physically seized and a temporary permit 
issued, and the statute does not specifically provide for suspension of privileges 
without physical seizure of the license and issuance of a physical temporary 
permit. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-1 5.) 
In making her argument, Kling relies primarily on In re Druffel, 136 ldaho 
853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002) (discussed at Respondent's brief, pp. 13-15). It does 
not appear, however, that this case is even relevant. In Druffel the ldaho 
Supreme Court affirmed a district court's order reversing an ldaho Transportation 
Department decision denying Druffel restricted driving privileges during the 
course of his suspension for an excessive BAC based solely on his non- 
residence in Idaho. Druffel, 136 ldaho at 855-57, 41 P.3d at 741-43. The court 
held that nonresidents "can apply for restricted driving privileges under I.C. § 18- 
8002A(9) so long as the nonresident applicant meets one of the circumstances 
listed in subsection (9)." Id. at 857, 41 P.3d at 743. In addressing whether the 
district court had reversed the initial suspension of driving privileges on this 
basis, however, the Court stated, "It does not appear that Druffel's suspension 
was reversed." a. at 857, 41 P.3d at 743. Had the matter been remanded, 
instead of appealed, the only decision by ITD would have been whether Druffel 
receive restricted driving privileges during the course of his suspension. Id. at 
857-58, 41 P.3d at 743-44. Because this case in no way addressed the 
adequacy of the notice provided to Druffel, and addressed only whether a 
nonresident can be denied restricted privileges during the course of a 
suspension, the Druffel decision has no application in this case. 
There is a small variance between the statute and the notice (and 
practice), when it comes to out-of-state driver's licenses.' The statute does not 
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state licenses, but requires providing 
temporary driving privileges for thirty days pending suspension, by issuance of a 
' The variance arises because the interstate Driver's License Compact does not 
allow the state of ldaho to issue a license to an out-of-state driver who has not 
surrendered her out-of-state license. I.C. § 49-2001, Art. V. The provision is to 
prevent persons from having simultaneous driver's licenses in multiple states. 
temporary permit. I.C. § 18-8002(4)(a); see also I.C. § 18-8002(3)(b). The 
notice differentiates the manner in which the refusing driver retains driving 
privileges for thirty days pending suspension, with an in-state driver having her 
license physically taken and a temporary permit issued and an out-of-state driver 
merely having the license she has be deemed valid in ldaho for thirty more days. 
(R., p. 9.) Because the notice conveys that the driver will have driving privileges 
for an additional thirty days before the suspension, the notice does accurately 
state the consequences of refusal, namely temporary driving privileges, followed 
by a one-year suspension, unless the driver shows cause in court. 
"Defendant [sic] must establish cause of a sufficient magnitude that it may 
be fairly said that a suspension of his license would be unjust or inequitable." 
re Griffiths, 1 13 ldaho 364, 372, 744 P.2d 92, 100 (1 987). Kling has failed to 
establish that the difference between physical seizure of her out-of-state license 
and issuing a temporary permit valid for 30 days, and allowing her to physically 
retain her driver's license but with an understanding it would be valid in ldaho for 
only 30 days, is such that would make suspension of her license for refusal of a 
BAC test unjust or inequitable. Moreover, Kling can prevail under this standard 
only if she can show that she was not "completely advised of [her] rights and 
duties under the statute." Id. at 370, 744 P.2d at 98. There is no reason to 
believe that Kling, or anyone else, would be misled as to the consequences of 
refusal under the statute where she was correctly informed that she would retain 
driving privileges for only thirty days, and thereafter a one-year suspension would 
be in effect, unless she successfully showed cause why her license should not 
be suspended. See Head v. State, 137 ldaho 1, 43 P.3d 760 (2002) (error in 
notice unrelated to decision to not take test not grounds for refusing to impose 
' suspension). Thus, although there is a small variance between the statute and 
the notice, there was no variance between the notice and the actual "rights and 
duties under the statute" such that it would be "unjust or inequitable" to suspend 
Kling's license for refusal. 
Kling also contends that the notice fails to inform out-of-state motorists 
that their licenses will be suspended if they refuse the requested BAC test. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 10-1 2.) The form very clearly states, however, that if the 
driver refuses the BAC testing her license will be "valid in ldaho for thirty (30) 
days" and that if no hearing is requested or if the driver does not prevail at a 
requested hearing her "license will be suspended with absolutely no driving 
privileges for one ( I )  year . . . ." (R., p. 9.) Kling's claim is without merit. 
Finally, the cases in which the appellate courts have found the notice 
inadequate are easily distinguishable from this case. In In re Virqil, 126 ldaho 
946, 895 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1995), the notice informed Virgil that if he refused 
the proffered test his license would be suspended and he would be given a 
temporary permit "unless you have a Commercial driver's license." Id. at 947, 
895 P.2d at 183. The court reasoned that the quoted clause did not clearly apply 
to only the issuance of a temporary permit but could reasonably be construed as 
saying that a commercial license would not be suspended. Id. Thus, the notice 
failed to "completely" inform Virgil, who had a commercial driver's license, of the 
consequences of his refusal. Id. 
In In re Beem, 119 ldaho 289, 805 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991), the notice 
informed Beem that his license would be suspended for 120 days if he refused, 
even though the statute had been amended to provide for a 180-day suspension. 
Id. at 290, 805 P.2d 496. Based on this discrepancy the magistrate declined to 
suspend Beem's license for 180 days and instead ordered a 120-day 
suspension. Id. The ldaho Court of Appeals reversed the magistrate and upheld 
the ruling of the district court that the statute did not authorize the adjustment of 
the penalty to fit the notice, but instead required the notice to accurately convey 
the penalty. Id. at 290-92, 805 P.2d at 496-98. "Beem had the right to be 
correctly advised by the officer of the true consequences of refusing to take the 
blood-alcohol test, i.e., that his license would be suspended for 180 days." Id. at 
292, 805 P.2d at 498. 
Finally, the ldaho Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that failure to inform a 
motorist of the right to independent testing at his own expense would have been 
cause to challenge the suspension. In re Griffiths, 113 ldaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 
92, 98 (1987). Such oversight was corrected, however, because Griffiths was 
later informed of the right and still refused testing. Id. 
Neither Beem, Virgil, nor Griffiths stand for the proposition that any 
variance whatsoever from the statutory language will result in a showing of cause 
why the test was refused. Rather, they stand for the proposition that an 
inadequate explanation of the actual rights under the statute or the 
consequences of refusal will so result. Here Kling failed to show that there was 
any failure to accurately apprise her of her rights or the consequences of her 
refusal. 
The magistrate and the district court were concerned that the statute 
discusses only the physical seizing of the driver's license and issuance of a 
temporary permit, while the notice (and the practice) was to seize only ldaho 
driver's licenses while allowing physical retention of out-of-state licenses that 
would be valid in ldaho for only 30 more days. Although the statute does not 
differentiate between in-state and out-of-state licenses, Kling ultimately failed to 
show that the notice did not adequately inform her of the consequences of her 
refusal. It is highly unlikely that Kling actually wanted her license physically 
taken, and equally unlikely that the manner in which she would retain driving 
privileges for 30 days pending the one-year suspension for refusal influenced her 
decision to refuse. Because the notice accurately informed Kling of what did 
actually happened upon her refusal she failed to demonstrate that suspension of 
her driving privileges was unjust or inequitable. The magistrate (and district 
court) therefore erred in dismissing the case rather than suspending Kling's 
driving privileges. 
D. Klinq Is Not Entitled To Costs Or Attorneys Fees 
Kling did not cross-appeal the lowers courts' denial of her request for 
costs and fees. Thus, this issue is not presently before the court. See I.A.R. 15. 
Likewise, Kling is not entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal as she 
has failed to show that the state pursued this appeal unreasonably and the state 
anticipates being the prevailing party. 
9 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Kling failed to carry her burden of 
demonstrating any entitlement to attorneys fees or costs on appeal. Kling has 
the burden of showing a statutory or contractual right to attorney fees. Sanchez 
v. ldaho Dept. of Correction, 143 ldaho 239, 243, 141 P.3d 1108, 11 12 (2006) 
(discussing "American rule" that parties generally bear own attorney fees). 
Moreover, Kling must show a specific waiver of sovereign immunity before he 
may collect attorney fees from the state. Id. at 244, 141 P.3d at 11 13. Kling 
cites to I.C. § 12-1 17 (Respondent's brief, pp. 20-21), but that section is only a 
partial waiver of sovereign immunity for judicial actions involving a "state agency" 
as that term is defined in I.C. $j 67-5201, I.C. § 12-117(4)(b). Kling does not 
claim, and has therefore failed to show, that this case is being litigated by a state 
agency as defined in the law. She has therefore failed to show a statutory basis 
for her claim and a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and 
the magistrate's order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings on 
whether Kling can show one of the justifications allowed by law. 
DATED this 18th day of June 201 0. 
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